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IISL-90-065 LAW AND PRACTICE· EUROPEAN NATIONAL SPACE AGENCIES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
Frans G. von der Dunk
International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University,
The Netherlands
The legal place and role of national space agencies in general has
not yet been the subject of much debate. This paper tries to argue
however that this problem is of some relevance indeed.
Concurrently with debating it namely, by concentrating on the case
of some European agencies the problems of defining a "national
space agency" and of the relevance of such definitions as to such a
place and role will be answered to some extent.
Thus, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty is seen as providing for a
subdivision of space agencies in 'governmental agencies' and 'non-
governmental entities', The combination of legal and practical
analysis, though undertaken only superficially in this paper, seems
to put most agencies in the latter category, with due consequence in
regard of international responsibility.
Similar consequences also arise in regard of Article VII of the Outer
Space Treaty, which is found to provide for another relevant
borderline, this time between national space agencies and private
enterprise. Again, legal and practical analysis provides for some
clues as to its relevance, this time in the field of international
liability for damage.
Apart from the responsibility- and liability-problems thus dealt
with in a space law-setting, both borderlines become relevant in
regard of the general international legal doctrine of 'state
immunity'. Of necessity, lack of law and practice in this regard
make the conclusion a provisional and general one as to the problem
of European national space agencies under international space law.
1. Introduction
Europe's venture into outer space uses a number of paths of
considerable diversity. The role of the European Space Agency, an
intergovernmental organization with 13 member states, an
associated member and a (non-European) state linked to it by means
of a cooperation agreement, has already often been discussed, both
in regard to its political and in regard to its legal aspects1,
Furthermore, growing attention is being paid to pri-,ate enterprise
active in space for commercial purposes, and their legal place in
space2. In EUTELSAT, EUMETSAT, and INTELSAT3 we even have
examples of 'bodies' bearing characteristics of both. However, in
space law neither international organizations nor private
companies rule supreme; that role is still preserved for states4.
States in their turn are active in space in a number of ways.
Depending on whether a certain activity is for military, scientific,
public utility- or commercial reasons, most of the time those
activities are actually undertaken by one ministry or another, at
any rate by a state organ clearly identifiable as such. This is the
case certainly for all states that do not yet have special bodies
exclusively occupied with space activities; and was the case for the
others indeed until the very creation of such a body. For example, in
West Germany until 1989 space activities were conducted under the
auspices of the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, with
the involvement of five other Ministries and the help of the
DFLRVS as a coordinating instance.
Sometimes however, state participation in, or control of outer space
activities is less clear and less direct. Such is the case for instance
with regard to national space agencies. Their place in international
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space law, predominantly directed at states as it is, is the subject of
this paper; a general overview of the legal position of some
European national space agencies will thus be provided. Many of
the remarks will be relevant in regard to other, even non-European,
space agencies, however for the sake of brevity I will exclude
NASA6, NASDA7 and others.
More precisely, I will concern myself with the French "Centre
Nationale des Etudes Spatiales" (CNES)8, the "National Board of
Space Activities" (NBSA) of Sweden9, the "Nederlands lnstituut
voor Vliegtuigontwikkeling en Ruimtevaart" (NIVR) of the
Netherlands10, the "British National Space Centre" (BNS011,
the Italian "Agenzia Spaziale Italiana" (ASI)12 and the
"Deutsche Agentur fur Raumfahrtangelegenheiten" (DARA) of
Germany13.
If one tries to define the place of national space agencies in
international space law, the first question in this regard turns out to
be the definitional one. What do the aforementioned space
agencies, diverse as they are in structures, tasks and activities,
have in common; what is their common denominator, why are they
all national space agencies? In other words, is a national space
agency a mere branch of government, entrusted with the task of
preparing, coordinating, supporting and executing space policies
decided on at government level? Or is it a semi-autonomous body,
partly public, partly private in character, operating in the mixed
world of state and private enterprise? What, in short, is their
legal character with a view to international space law?
It is submitted that concurrently with trying to provide an answer
to these questions, it will become clear where the relevance of the
definitional problem lies, why it is important to try to define a
national space agency as such and how in its tum the analysis of
place and role could provide for such a definition. Thus a 'Strange
Circle of Reasoning' is created of which Hofstaedter would be
proud14: the two sets of answers bite each other in the tail.
2. Article VI Outer Space Treaty
In this light, this short survey will start with one of the two basic
problems which are of paramount relevance for both states and
private enterprise activities in space, wherefore it seems logical to
consider it relevant for space agencies as well: the problem of
responsibili ty,
In this regard, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty provides for
responsibility for compliance with space law by stating that the
state is responsible for national activities1S, whether carried out
by governmental agencies or non-governmental entities16. In the
latter case, this responsibility is further elaborated upon by the
duty of authorization and continuing supervision by the
appropriate state17.
The question thus automatically arises: is a national space agency a
government agency under the terms of Article VI? This is not a
superfluous question, as it may seem at first instance, nor is it a
question to be answered without a need to go into some detail. If an
agency, because of private legal elements in its operational mode or
organizational structure, is to be considered as a non-governmental
entity, it becomes important to discover whether the state in
question has taken measures providing for such authorization and
supervision. If not, if the agency is a governmental agency in the
sense of Article VI; is this fact enough for international
responsibility to be taken care of domestically?
It then boils down to the question to be asked first: what is a
government agency? As far as I know, no definition has been
provided for this term as of yet, so I take the liberty of providin~
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my own. I hold a government agency to be a structured body for
policy and execution concerning a well defined field or subject-
matter, if it is integrated for the full 100% into the bureaucratic
structure of government. This applies inter alia to its decision
making process, its personnel policies and hierarchy, and its
financial household, three criteria providing for a useful tool for
distinction.
Such a definition would, in case of application to national space
agencies, fit logically into Article VI, because a government agency
thus by definition would be under full legal authorization and
supervision of its government. No explicit mentioning under Article
VI of such a duty would be necessary for them.
In practice however, most national space agencies show a
somewhat hybrid structure. A short overview of the space agencies
under consideration will immediately clarify this; a much more
detailed analysis will be needed however in order to come to a
definitive conclusion in respect of each specific agency.
Financially speaking, those space agencies are sometimes
completely dependent on government budgets. This holds good for
instance for the BNSC18. Those space agencies created 'merely' to
play roles such as the Dutch NIVR, promoting the aerospace sector
and advising government on air and space questions19, or, originally
at least, the Swedish NBSA, registering and controlling national
space activities20, no doubt depend solely on government budgets
also.
More interesting in this regard however are quite a number of other
cases. The ASI is called a "half-autonomous" agency, "with its own
budget", spreading its assignments on a "private legal basis"; the
funds however deriving directly from the Ministry of Finance21, to
be used according to the National Space Plan22. The DARA is
organized as a private firm, but with the Federal Government as
sole shareholder23 : The CNES, a "public corporation"24, already
obtains some autonomous income from its operation of the Kourou
launching base in French Guyana25, whereas on the other side of
the budget it is a large shareholder in Arianespace , owning 34% of
its shares, and responsible for the realization of its launches.26
As to its personnel, it usually can not be seen as such as being totally
comprised by government officials. The BNSC for instance not only
employs government officials, but 'representatives' of industry
firms as we1l27. DARA's personnel expressly is to be classified as
non-governmentaI28, and it seems, that the same holds good for
ASI's personnel by way of detachment to a large extent from
go v ern men t 29. CNES's highest organ, the Conseil
d'Administration, even comprises 11 persons (among 18), not
necessarily being government officials in any sense of the word30.
Likewise, NIVR's Board not only comprises government
representatives, but those of industry and scientific research
institutes as we1l31 .
On the other hand, some government officials almost invariably
occupy usually important positions within the agencies; in fact, its
highest organs are either consisting of government ministers or
their representatives, or responsible to them. The ASI falls within
the control of the Italian Minister for Research and Technology,
whilst international activities need the consent of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs as we1l32. The CNES is subordinated to the French
Ministries of Research and Industry, with other Ministries being
involved also by way of the Conseil d'Administration. Likewise,
the bodies ultimately shaping DARA's actions are comprised of
Ministers (with the Federal Chancellor as chairman) respectively
State-secretaries of 8 Ministries33.
Thus, its decision making process usually is an amalgam of
governmental and non-governmental elements, or to use other words,
of public and private elements. The CNES thus should be seen as
"un etablissement public national 11 caractere scientifique et
technique, industriel et commercial", which means that it is to
function, relative to the state, "de maniere autonome, mais pour son
compte et sous son contr6Ie"34. The NBSA seems to be a government
agency, at least when its legal basis is analyzed, taking care of
Swedish liability-obligations under space law; on the other hand
functioning relatively autonomous, being merely obliged to
"consult" or "inform" (other) branches of government35, and
nowadays even on itself involved in the German Saenger project
concerning a hypersonic plane36.
In summary, this structure takes care of the authorization-and-
supervision-duty, provided by Article VI in the case of non-
governmental entities, to a, for the time being, satisfying extent. As
far as this is provided for by implication through in-built controls,
the agency in question may be considered a 'governmental agency' in
the sense of Article VI, as far as explicit dependence on certain
parts of government is the case, the agency may be considered a
'non-governmental' agency. Most European agencies, as shown, are
hybrid structures, with both implicit and explicit controls present,
and therefore would seem to fall within both categories.
As the distinction of Article VI between 'government agencies' and
'non-governmental entities' however to my mind is absolute37,
where the latter are to be subjected to government control and
authorization but no such duty is formulated in regard of the
former, supporting my definition of government agency as provided,
only integration of the agency in the bureaucratic structure of
government to the full should be considered to make it a government
agency. As most agencies under consideration do not qualify as such,
they are not 'government agencies' under Article VI; explicit control
mechanisms which would have been superfluous under Article VI if
the agency in question were to be considered as a government agency
under its terms, are provided each time - and, as stated, for the
moment must be deemed to be sufficient.
Perhaps few 'national legal gaps' will therefore appear in those
respects as a result of international responsibility arising precisely
because of those explicit control mechanisms. However, once the
above qualification of a space agency is accepted, the necessity will
arise each time in regard of its activities to clarify whether the
responsibility of the state is taken care of, nationally, by either
implicit controls - after all present in all cases of national space
agencies as well - or explicit controls, or whether it will have to be
taken care of by a new measure providing for explicit control. This
problem will gain relevance in view both of the ongoing
commercialization and privatization of space activities, and of the
measure of internationalization, which almost of necessity will
influence national space agencies' operations of whatever kind as
well. CNES's semi-commercial operation of Kourou already
provides an example in point. This trend should not be allowed to
lead to a lessening in fact of governmental authorization and
supervision by imperceptible advances of non-governmental
elements.
Furthermore, the fact that a distinction has been drawn through
the above analysis between governmental and non-governmental
entities with regard to national space agencies, may already be of
relevance in respect of the problems of state immunity38.
3.Article VII Outer Space Treaty
For the moment, let us however turn to that other basic space law
problem, always immediately springing to mind in regard of
especially private enterprise active in outer space, that of
liability. The remarks made at the end of the previous paragraph
namely especially hold good when semi-autonomous agencies,
partly governmental but therefore according to my definition non-
governmental entities under Article VI, become involved in the
launching of space objects. Such involvement of course may trigger
application of Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the
relevant Articles of the Liability Convention39. Articles II and III
of the Liability Convention for example apportion liability for
damage to the launching state.
When a national space agency launches a space object, while being
a real government agency, it is the state itself which launches, and
no problems of attribution will arise40. If it is not a real government
agency however, under whatever definition, problems do arise. The
state of the national space agency in question could then be
considered liable only under four headings providing for such
attribution.
Two headings are applicable to begin with if the launch was seen
as being either performed from the state's territory or from its
facilities41 . In a case of a national space agency, this would be quite
possible, perhaps even usual, but it would by no means be automatic.
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So far, none of the space agencies seemed to have undertaken such
activities; what however if the CNES for instance is granted the
competence by the French government to take care of French
participation by way of ESA in the International Space Station to
be built in upcoming years?42 After all, this September Sweden's
NBSA has agreed to spend some 5,4 million US dollars in the
upcoming years on hypersonic aerodynamics for the German project
on "Saenger", the hypersonic plane to be developed43 . And one
month later, Italy's ASI made a bid to participate in the same
Saenger project for a 15-20% share of the preliminary work (worth
approximately 36-48 million US dollars), to be precisely, on its
design and propulsion system44.
A third possibility of a heading attributing activities of a space
agency to 'its' state for the purpose of liability would seem to lie in
the launching being seen as a state activity yet45. This however
was excluded by my very hypothesis of the space agency being a
non-governmental agency under the terms of Article VI. Unless the
rather strained construction would be endorsed that enough 'state
elements', however defined, are present in the space agency defined
as non-governmental to yet define its activities as state activities,
and presuming of course the first two headings are not applicable
either, this leaves us with only one option, that of the fourth
heading possibly applicable.
A state then could still be held liable for damage arising out of a
launch where its space agency was involved, even if it would be no
government agency and neither the state's territory nor its
facilities would have been used for the launch, if the launch could
be seen as being procured by the state46. This in fact encompasses
two possibilities: the state in question financing the particular
launch in question, which will often be the case but by no means
would be automatically so, or the agency in question, no matter how
it functions or operates, still being financially dependent on the
state in question.
In regard of the first, we have already seen a possibility arising
e.g. for the CNES, to take part financially in launches of
Arianespace's rockets, with funds not derived from government
incomes47. Similar possibilities exist also for the NBSA and the
ASI in regard of the Saenger plane48.
Once therefore such a space agency should not be seen as a
government agency any longer, the question as to liability may
have become paramount. General international legal principles
might apply to fill the legal gap, such as that of 'due care'
responsibility applied to liability49. However, such use of general
principles of course may entail other difficulties, especially as to
whether monetary compensation is the right form of reparation for
violation of a due care obligation50. This is not the right place to go
into this problem any further however.
The latter possibility in regard of the fourth heading, relating to
structural financing, applies to all national space agencies dealt
with, though not always to the full - as, again, the example of at
least the CNES shows. So, the conclusion must then be that, despite
the fact that according to the definition provided before few space
agencies are government agencies under the terms of Article VI,
problems of attribution in regard of damage under Article VII will
not arise as long as the space agency under consideration is at least
partly dependent on the state in question in a structural way,
because this makes that state liable in the last resort as a state (at
least partly) procuring the launching.
If on the other hand the structural financial dependence of the
agency would disappear, still presuming it of course to be a non-
governmental entity in the sense of Article VI as well, the agency
for all practical purposes would have become a private enterprise -
perhaps exploiting a public use facility within a state-provided
legal framework, but a private enterprise nevertheless. After all,
more often than not private enterprise in space enjoys non-structural
financial government support, like subsidies and financial
guarantees of an ad hoc-character, as well.51
Thus a second borderline has been drawn with regard to national
space agencies, this time dividing the latter from private
enterprises. Again, for the moment such a borderline may seem
academic, but it is submitted that this will be increasingly less so to
the extent that ongoing trends of commercialization, privatization
and internationalization will continue to influence national space
agencies as well. It will be necessary to keep an eye on this
development, if only in order not to allow the borderline to be
passed without notice, where that might entail serious legal gaps
as to the attribution of liability. Again furthermore, the borderline
thus elaborated has other consequences emanating from a general
international legal problem.
4. The question of state immunity
Both borderlines as defined before namely may become relevant in
regard of the question of state immunity. 'State immunity' is a
doctrine of general public international law, which forms part of
the body of space law as far as the latter does not deride from the
former52. Particularly in the case of national space agencies this
sounds logical. While from time to time being active in outer space,
they are still national entities one way or another constituted
according to domestic legislation and earthbound in most of its
material aspects, such as its activities, the presence of its personnel
and capital goods etcetera. Where such space agencies moreover
become involved most of the time merely in earthbound stages of a
project, such as not only government policy-preparation,-
coordination and -execution, but also such as NBSA's work on
hypersonic aerodynamics for the Saenger project may amount t053,
will it not become even harder to apply space law to the complete
exclusion of general international law? Perhaps its actions and
activities should even be considered primarily, or at least on an
equal footing, as actions and activities of other (semi-)public bodies
in other sectors of the (international) economy, falling under
general public international law.
It will be clear at any rate, that a doctrine like that of state
immunity indeed can be deemed to be applicable to space agencies,
under the relevant circumstances. This doctrine excludes acts of a
state for that very reason from the jurisdiction of courts. Nowadays,
the relative version of the theory rules supreme: only those acts
done in its very capacity as a state, the so-called 'acta jure
imperii', are thus excluded from jurisdiction. So-called 'acta jure
gestionis', where the state acts in a private legal capacity, are not
excluded from jurisdiction.54 The question then arising of course is,
what criteria are to be used to distinguish the one from the other?
Two main trends arose in this respect. According to one line of
thought, it was the nature of the activity concerned that was to
determine its character as 'jure imperii' or 'jure gestionis'; according
to others, it was the purpose of the activity which was the
essential criterion. Both authors and courts differed and keep on
differing in their choices.55
The relevance of this doctrine of general international law for the
legal question concerning national space agencies, viz. the questions
concerning their legal definitions, relates to the definitional
problems in a very direct way. In as far as the first borderline is
concerned, the problem of distinguishing 'acta jure imperii' from
'acta jure gestionis' becomes relevant in the following manner.
Is the nature of the agency's activity to be considered as dividing
'imperii' from 'gestionis', no difference can be discovered between
governmental and non-governmental agencies as defined before as
such, only between specific activities, which may be considered as
either of the two according to their respective nature.
The most that could be said is, that the tendency for activities of a
governmental space agency to be governmental in nature will be
stronger, than for those of a non-governmental one. In the former
case it will be more likely for those agencies to become involved e.g.
in military reconnaissance activities, or preparation and
coordination, and in some cases execution, of gpvernment policies,
which by nature must be considered to be 'imperii'-activities56, but
the borderline is not hard and fast.
So far, it seems most European space agencies are involved in both
sorts of activities, albeit to different degrees. The NIVR and BNSC
occupy one end of the scale, by mainly being active in preparing
government policies, coordinating them and sometimes executing
them as we1l57. On the other hand, agencies like the CNES and the
ASI are much more involved in activities 'gestionis' by nature, such
as tendering or subscribing to certain projects in commercial or semi-
commercial modes58. In between, for example the NBSA seems to be
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moving from the former position to the latter, increasingly
becoming involved in commercial enterprises59.
Governmental agencies in general may become involved in
contracting for certain products or services in a purely private
manner, as much as, the other way round, agencies non-
governmental according to my definition (being, after all, in the
case of space agencies still agencies predominantly governmental!)
may become involved in activities of a governmental nature.
Therefore, in each specific instance it has to be analyzed whether
state immunity should apply or not.
Is however the purpose of the activity the test for 'imperii' or
'gestionis', it seems that almost by definition the activities of a
governmental agency would become immune from jurisdiction: its
very incorporation-to-the-full into the bureaucratic structure of
government implies every activity of the agency to be for
government purposes, as defined by that same government. It would,
then, not make any difference whether the governmental agency so
defined would act exclusively as the NIVR and the BNSC do, or
would become heavily involved also in commercial and semi-
commercial operations such as the CNES and the ASI are60 .
Whether the court of another state would respect such a claim as to
immunity in a case pending before it, is of course another matter61 .
In contrast, activities of a non-governmental agency by definition
would seem to remain subject to jurisdiction under the purpose-test.
By way of the duty to authorize and supervise, as provided for
under Article VI Outer Space Treaty, distance and a distinction are
created between the state/the government and the space agency,
logically leading to the conclusion that the purpose, and the
activities of the agency undertaken in order to achieve that
purpose, would not qualify for the immunity granted to state
activities 'jure imperii'.
A priori, that is; of course special legislation could provide for
delegation of a task with a typically governmental character to
the agency in question, as some institutional links between
government and space agencies in practice have always been
prOVided for, no space agency defined as non-governmental under
Article VI is bereft of complete, or even predominating, government
control. The circle is closed thereby once more, because the
formulation or interpretation of the legal basis or bases of existence
of the space agency can constitute for all practical purposes this
very same 'special legislation'.
Thus, we arrive at the second borderline defined supra, that
between national space agencies and private enterprise, the latter
presumed to be structurally independent as to its financial
household as a decisive criterion for distinction. Acts of space
agencies namely, as shown, could be or become immune, even if they
were non-governmental agencies under our definition, both under
the nature- and under the purpose-test; whereas acts of private
enterprises by definition can never be immune from jurisdiction.
5. Conclusion
However, the doctrinal battle between nature- and purpose-test
has not yet been fully consumed62 . At the same time, to my
knowledge no legal battles have been fought out yet concerning
immunity questions of national space agencies. Practice thus fails us
completely here, and therefore the sta te of law is still very unclear
in this regard.
Perhaps therefore starting at the other side of the problem, as I
have tried to do, by looking at the application in practice of the
notions of responsibility, liability and state immunity, may help us
in this regard. This paper could do no more than provide the
general guide-lines; how the borderlines have to be drawn in regard
of each specific agency, would apparently depend on the results of
detailed analysis of constitutive documents, relevant domestic law,
internal rules, modes of operation and the like, and perhaps even of
personnel-contracts.
Therefore, although I hesitate to write these words down in a
paper for a conference with "Peace and Progress" as its motto,
perhaps a few of those old-fashioned battles (in court) would mean
a lot of progress in clarification of the legal situation of national
space agencies under international (space) law. At any rate, they
would mean a lot of progress in regard of the professional and
financial situation of us space lawyers.
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